It is necessary to begin with a plain reality.
The Kurds (SDF), with an estimated 120,000–150,000 armed forces in Northern Syria, equipped with modern weapons and hardened by years of combat, represent de facto the largest military force on Syrian territory.
This is not an assertion of preference or ideology; it is the arithmetic of power on the ground.
Neither the new administration in Damascus, nor HTS-derived factions, nor Erdoğan-backed militias, nor the fragmented remnants of the Syrian army possess the capacity to militarily dismantle this force on their own.
For this reason, the claim that “Damascus has a military option against the Kurds” exists only in theory. In practice, it would amount to strategic suicide.
At this point, the question is no longer military.
It is a matter of strategic reason.
The Kurds’ Real Strength: The Capacity Not to Fight
This point must be underlined. The most decisive choice made by the Kurds over the last five to six years has been this: after defeating ISIS, they consciously refused to exhaust their military power.
Very few actors in the region are capable of such restraint. They did not pursue a post-ISIS war of revenge.
They did not march on Damascus.
They did not opt for total confrontation with Turkey.
They did not seek regional hegemony. Instead, they maintained coordination with the United States, preserved their position within the international coalition, avoided direct confrontation with Israel through de-confliction, and sought to convert battlefield strength into political bargaining power.
This was not romanticism, it was rational calculation. Because the Kurds understand a fundamental principle of statecraft: losing a hard-won power in the wrong war is worse than never having acquired it at all.
Not Losing the State for a Town
What we are witnessing is a clear transition—from guerrilla logic to state logic.
Rather than exhausting their accumulated power for a town or neighborhood that does not lie directly within their strategic core, the Kurds have chosen to grow according to conditions and conjuncture.
They no longer interpret tactical withdrawal as strategic defeat.
They no longer equate territorial loss with political collapse. Time itself has become a strategic variable working in their favor. Seen from this perspective, the withdrawal from Aleppo was not a sign of military weakness, but the postponement of a larger war and the preservation of the negotiating table. This is not the reflex of a militia. It is the reflex of a proto-state.
The Damascus Reality: Compromise as Obligation
Let us be clear.
Damascus has no alternative to accommodation with the Kurds. It cannot defeat them militarily. A prolonged internal war would suffocate the new regime before it consolidates. A war with the Kurds would pull the United States and Western actors back into the field. Crushing Kurdish forces would reopen space for ISIS and similar formations. And the Turkey–Iran–Israel equation would rapidly spiral out of control.
For Damascus, therefore, the Kurds are not a “problem to be eliminated,” but one of the unavoidable founding partners of any viable state structure.
The Sharaa Question: Actor or Instrument
The position of Sharaa is critical. Sharaa—and similar figures—functions primarily as a carrier figure.
He does not generate power; he transmits it. His autonomous decision-making capacity is limited.
The Kurds are fully aware of this. For that reason, they do not engage in ideological confrontation with Sharaa himself. They focus instead on the power architectures behind him.
Recent developments confirm this reading. The fact that U.S. representative Tom Barrack met Mazlum Abdi not in Syria, but in a region explicitly referred to as “Kurdistan,” clearly indicates where Washington situates the Kurdish question. Equally telling was the seating arrangement: Barrack and Masoud Barzani at the head of the table.
There is, however, a clear red line. If Sharaa seeks to define his political existence through a total war against the Kurds, it would mark his end. Because if the Kurds are forced to fight, it will no longer be a defensive war but an existential one. Such a conflict would not remain local.
Turkey, Iran, Israel, and the United States would all be drawn into the equation simultaneously. This scenario serves no one’s interests.
Turkey Factor: The Provocative Logic of the Erdoğan Regime
Turkey’s role is unambiguous.
Driven by the provocative mind of the Erdoğa regime, both domestically and externally, Ankara has consistently attempted to drag the SDF into open confrontation. The reasons are clear. The Kurds’ patient and conciliatory posture undermines Ankara’s strategy. The Erdoğan regime and Turkey’s deep structures do not want the Kurds to emerge as a legitimate political actor. If conflict erupts, the familiar “terrorism” narrative can be reactivated.
Yet the Kurds have consistently chosen not to fall into this trap—avoiding arms unless forced, and working instead to isolate Turkey diplomatically.
Over time, this works in the Kurds’ favor.
Conclusion: Power, and the Discipline Not to Use It
The Kurds’ greatest advantage today is not merely their capacity to fight. It is the coexistence of two qualities rarely found together in the Middle East: the ability to wage war, and the political maturity to refrain from it.
For this reason: withdrawal is not weakness, compromise is not surrender, patience is not cowardice.
It is the conduct of a power that understands how to survive—and how to grow.
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